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6
THE EU BUDGET'S IMPACT ON PUBLIC
OPINION
KAI STERN
University of Washington

Abstract
Public opinion on the European Union (EU) is significant and therefore a worthwhile
topic of consideration. Analyses have identified and ordered the factors that impact public
opinion on the EU, as well analyzed the efficacy of EU funds. Yet the confluence of these
two lines of inquiry is understudied. Some Member States have surpluses and others deficits
relative to the EU budget, which could impact citizens’ perceptions of the EU. To gauge
this potential relationship, this article notes deficit and surplus Member States and responses
to one Eurobarometer question about trust in the European Commission from 2000-2013.
These variables are used to evaluate the EU budget’s impact on public opinion towards
the EU. The data suggest that there is a limited correlation between the two. EU funds are
overshadowed as a cause of public opinion formation on the EU by other forces, but can
still influence it at the margins.
Keywords
European Commission, European Union budget, political trust, public opinion

EU Budget and Public Opinion

68

Kai Stern University of Washington

Introduction
Public opinion on the European Union (EU) is highly consequential. It can have a
significant impact on politics and policy in the EU. Attitudes towards European integration
as an idea or the EU as an institution have manifested themselves in a spectacular fashion
through national referenda on EU membership and treaties. They do so in more quotidian
modes through regional, national, and supranational elections and public consultation with
government institutions. The EU as an institution is dependent on maintaining some level
of public support and legitimization.
The importance of public opinion’s impact on EU politics and policymaking means
that understanding how public attitudes towards the EU are formed and why they change is
a vital topic of consideration. Hypothesizing about the reasons behind individuals’ attitudes
towards the EU has tended to center on either identity related or utilitarian rationales. Most
analyses in the latter category have focused on the broader economic implications of the
EU, seeing the EU as primarily economic in nature and theorizing that the distributional
consequences of integration have a strong causative impact on individual attitudes towards
the EU. Yet, the specific impact of the EU budget has been only marginally analyzed,
despite its attractions. The direct pecuniary mechanisms available to the EU are restricted to
its budget. Furthermore, unlike the more nebulous benefits proceeding from the common
market, the EU budget has a tangible and traceable quality. Individuals can see the impact
of and may be subsidized by programs financed by the EU budget, such as those targeting
regional development. Whether the EU can influence public attitudes through budgetary allocations is consequential to the extent that the EU may utilize such mechanisms
to enhance its legitimacy. Thus, an understanding of the extent to which the EU budget
affects public opinion towards the EU is politically as well as academically important. Using
public opinion and budgetary data derived from the Standard Eurobarometer surveys and
the European Commission, this analysis argues that national surpluses or deficits relative to
the EU budget have a small but present impact on public opinion towards the EU if there
are no other strong economic factors such as recessions.
This article will proceed by reviewing the relevant literature on public opinion on the
EU. Its strengths and weaknesses will be explored. It will then introduce its own empirical
contribution based on the underexplored gaps in the literature. The research design and
methodology will be discussed, followed by an analysis of the data. It will conclude by
assessing the implications of the findings for current academic debates and future policymaking.
Public Attitudes on European Integration
There are a variety of hypothesized variables impacting individual opinion on the EU,
generally specified as European integration. In an extensive analysis of the relative validity
of each of these explanations, Gabel (1998) identifies five different theoretical approaches.
These are: cognitive mobilization, political values, utilitarian appraisals of integrative policy,
class partisanship, and support for national government (Gabel, 1998). Each of these variables has been argued to significantly structure individual attitudes to the EU. Yet, cognitive mobilization and political values, which can be subsumed under the classification of
identity-related rationales, and utilitarian theory have proved most enduring (Gabel, 1998;
Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Garry and Tilley, 2009).
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2015/iss1/8
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Identity-related issues are argued to be highly consequential for individual opinion
formation and change. Hooghe and Marks (2004) claim that, “citizens do indeed take into
account the economic consequences of European integration, but conceptions of group
membership appear to be more powerful” (p. 415). An individuals’ identity structures the
modes by which they then formulate opinions on the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2005).
Additional integration may have increased the salience of identity-related concerns by
highlighting the possibility of social-policy harmonization (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007).
National identity is clearly very much a part of individual opinion formation and change.
Yet utilitarian appraisals should not be dismissed as less relevant or impactful. The
idea that individual opinion on the EU is most affected by utilitarian appraisals has been
both theoretically enduring and empirically successful. Various economic ramifications of
EU integration have been shown in multiple analyses to be highly correlated with public
opinion on the EU (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel,
1998; Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier, 2014). Indeed, Gabel (1998) discovered that
economic considerations were more impactful than any other posited variables and that
“the utilitarian theory provides a robust explanation for variation in support for integration”
(p. 350-351). Identity was found to be much less important (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2004).
More recently, Garry and Tilley (2009) argue that identity is a function of and conditioned
by utilitarian appraisals. Economic concerns are still very much a valid independent variable
affecting public opinion.
Utilitarian appraisals are rationalized by the institutional logic and structure of the
EU. EU membership results in direct and indirect economic costs and benefits (Anderson
& Reichert 1996, p. 233). Directly, as has been noted, the EU budget redistributes money
amongst Member States and allocates funds to specific causes and individuals. Indirectly,
it can offer increased “trade with EU members [and] opportunities for professional mobility” (Anderson & Reichert, 1996, p. 233). With regard to individual opinion formation,
these benefits can either take the form of advantages for the nation to which the individual
belongs or personal perquisites. Individuals’ “differences in economic welfare shape their
attitudes toward integration . . . [so] that citizens’ support for integration is positively related
to their welfare gains from integrative policy” (Gabel, 1998, p. 336). Thus, individuals are
driven by pecuniary concerns for themselves or their country and formulate opinions based
on these facts.
Common to most scholarly work on individual attitudes towards the EU has been
the operationalized dependent variable. Previous studies have utilized one question from
the Eurobarometer surveys: “generally speaking, do you think (your country’s) membership in the Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” (Anderson
& Reichart, 1996, p. 239; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, p. 518; Gabel & Whitten, 1997,
p. 86). In doing so, they have hypothesized relationships between numerous independent
variables and public opinion on EU membership more generally. They have usually done
so in order to investigate the causes of public-opinion formation and change on European
integration (Anderson & Reichart, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Garry & Tilley, 2009). The use of
this question as the dependent variable is open to several critiques. It is extremely general
to query individuals on their feelings towards group membership in a relatively nebulous
organization. Individuals’ attitudes towards the specific institutions comprising the EU
are therefore muddled. Only a few analyses have corrected for this by focusing on the
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EU as an institution (Harteveld, van der Meer, & De Vries, 2013). An individual with
strong conceptions about democratic representation might have a positive image of the
European Parliament and its national government, as elected bodies, but a negative one
of the bureaucratic European Commission. Furthermore, with regards to the EU budget,
the European Commission is heavily involved in its distribution, in contrast to institutions
directly representative of the Member States, such as the Council of the European Union.
Rather than associating EU funds with a generalized notion of national membership in the
EU, individuals might instead connect them—and the derivative budgetary surpluses and
deficits—with the institution responsible for them. Previous analyses of individual attitudes
towards the EU would thus benefit from corroboration with more specific causal and
impacted variables.
The Efficacy of EU Funds
Scholarly work on the EU budget represents another distinct subfield of EU politics.
Analyses of the budget have generally taken the form of evaluations to determine the efficacy of the EU budget in the fulfillment of programmatic goals. The structure and objectives
of the EU budget have meant that most of these have assessed the economic ramifications
of EU funds, attempting to discover their impact on variables such as growth and regional
convergence, either generally or in specific economic sectors. Only when programs are
socially oriented have scholars analyzed their noneconomic impacts (Mitchell, 2015).
Analyses focusing on the efficacy of EU funds have typically taken the form of assessments of funds’ economic impacts and have generally focused on cohesion policy and
structural funds. The results of these investigations have been strikingly inconclusive. It has
been argued that “EU regional support through the structural fund has a significant and
positive impact on the growth performance on European regions and, hence, contributes
to greater equality in productivity and income in Europe,” thereby fulfilling its programmatic goal of cohesion (Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, & Verspagen, 2003, p. 640).
Others have concluded that there is some association between EU funds and cross-national
convergence targets (Barry, 2003). Katsaitis and Doulos (2009) nuance this view, noting
that national institutional quality significantly impacted the economic ramifications of EU
structural funds. While “for countries with high quality institutions [structural funds] have
a positive impact on FDI . . . for countries with low quality institutions the impact can be
negative” (Katsaitis & Doulos, 2009, p. 573). This corroborates earlier research suggesting that the EU funds’ efficacy is conditional on national institutional quality (Ederveen,
de Groot, & Nahuis, 2006). Other reports have also been critical of the degree to which
cohesion policy has successfully achieved its goals (Boldrin & Canova, 2001). This broad
variation demonstrates that the verdict is still out on the economic successes engendered by
EU funds, a proxy for their general value.
Certain EU-funded programs lend themselves to analyses of social ramifications. One
example is the academic debate about the impact of the Erasmus program, a transnational
exchange arrangement for students (Mitchell, 2015; Van Mol, 2013). Here the focus has
been on assessing whether the introduction of young persons to other cultural environments promotes the creation and development of a European identity (Mitchell, 2015;
Sigalas, 2010). Some scholars have concluded that the program has mixed social effects
(Sigalas, 2010). By contrast, others argue that “Erasmus students’ identities do change over
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2015/iss1/8
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the course of their sojourn” (Mitchell, 2015, p. 345). In contrast to pecuniary enhancements, the social impacts of EU programs are less studied, although here too their relative
effects are inconclusive.
In being limited to wide-ranging but inconclusive studies of economic-value added
generated by EU funds and narrow programmatic evaluations of societal implications,
alternative metrics for evaluating the efficacy of EU funds have generally been ignored. For
instance, if the allocation of EU funds is positively correlated with a more positive image
of or greater trust in European institutions, EU funds could still be considered worthwhile.
No scholarly work has been dedicated to the elucidation of this relationship and the most
related analyses have instead been subsumed under the broader literature of individual attitudes towards European integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993). The literature on EU
funds would benefit from additional research on EU funds’ social implications and alternate
means of assessing their value.
Data and Methodology
This analysis seeks to offer some redress for the previously elucidated weaknesses in
prior work on both individual attitudes towards the EU and the EU budget. It focuses
specifically on identifying the impact of EU funds on public-opinion formation and change
with regards to the EU as an institution. To do so, it analyzes the differences in individual
trust in the European Commission in Member States with surpluses and deficits relative to
the EU budget from 2000-2013, drawing on data from the European Commission and the
Standard Eurobarometer surveys.
The EU budget should have an impact on individual attitudes towards the EU.
Although the indirect benefits associated with EU membership might outweigh those
derived from the EU budget, they are more nebulous. It is difficult enough for individuals
to locate responsibility for decisions with tangible implications, let alone those that operate
through a series of interrelated and contingent mechanisms. By contrast, the EU budget is
a much simpler and more comprehensible system for understanding the costs and benefits
of EU membership. Directly, the EU funds numerous causes through its budgetary allocations. It enables the existence of a variety of programs whose goals range from agricultural
subsidization to the creation of regional transportation networks. The types of projects
funded by the EU ensure that its budget can have an impact despite its comparatively small
size. The European Commission emphasizes that “EU and national budgets serve different,
yet complementary purposes. The EU budget targets areas where EU money can generate
added value” (European Commission, 2015). Importantly, it does not spend any money
on national prerogatives such as defense or social security (European Commission, 2015).
By subsidizing areas such as the agricultural industry, where it has assumed many of the
roles of the national governments, the EU has an impact greater than a mere comparison
of budgetary size might suggest.
The EU budget affects Member States in a differential fashion. Member States’ relationship with the EU budget can be broadly characterized into those with a surplus and
those with a deficit relative to it. Some Member States contribute more to the budget
than they receive and thus can be seen to subsidize the EU. Others receive much more
than they contribute and consequently are subsidized by the budget. These deficits and
surpluses can be quite significant: In 2013, Sweden operated on a deficit equal to .51%
EU Budget and Public Opinion
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of gross national income (GNI), while Hungary operated on a surplus equal to 5.33% of
GNI (EUR-Lex, 2014). Member States that pay into the budget more than they receive
from it are subsidizing programs whose benefits do not accrue directly to them. The EU is
much more heterogeneous than other polities that redistribute funds through federal fiscal
transfers, such as Germany and the United States. EU citizens do not generally share similar
historical backgrounds, ethnic traditions, or languages. Individuals should be unlikely to
appreciate the use of their country’s tax revenues in the subsidization of other countries.
That individuals’ perceptions of national economic performance impact their opinions is an
accepted regularity in the social sciences. Within the context of the United States, the most
enduring “individual-level evidence for economic voting . . . has come from questions that
ask respondents about general business conditions or the country’s ‘economic situation’”
(Duch, 2007, p. 811). In the European context, “support for the EC is indeed related to
national economic conditions,” although here “citizen support for European integration
is influenced by a combination of domestic and international factors” (Eichenberg and
Dalton, 1993, p. 521, 528). That individuals’ perceptions of their country’s welfare relative to the EU budget would affect their attitudes towards the EU is therefore a reasonable
assumption. Insofar as citizens are aware of the fiscal transfer inherent in the EU budget,
their attitudes towards the EU should be affected. Citizens of countries that benefit in
the aggregate from EU funds should have a more positive image of EU institutions than
those that subsidize EU programs. In other words, public opinion on the EU should vary
in accordance with their countries’ operating budgetary balance in dealings with the EU.
Higher relative surpluses should be associated with more positive opinions and greater relative deficits with negative ones.
The European Commission is a reasonable choice to analyze the impact of EU budgetary allocations. Of all the EU institutions, the European Commission is the most involved
in the management and implementation of the budget. Although “some 76% of the budget is spent under what is known as ‘shared management,’ with individual EU countries
actually distributing funds and managing expenditure,” the European Commission is still
the most appropriate actor to analyze (European Commission, 2015). It manages 22% of
EU funds directly and “ultimate responsibility for implementing the budget lies with the
European Commission” (European Commission, 2015). Discursively, the budget is labeled
as the EU budget, not that of individual Member States. Individuals should therefore be
more likely to associate the EU budget with either the EU as a general institution or with
the European Commission.
EU expenditures are coded using financial data provided by the European Commission.
Details of the 2000-2006, 2007-2013, and 2014-2020 budgetary cycles are readily available (EUR-Lex, 2014). From this information, a comprehensive picture of the income
and expenditure of the EU can be reconstructed. The net operating surplus or deficit as a
percentage of GNI of each Member State is recorded. Thus, the relative amount that each
Member State either subsidizes or gains from membership in the EU is readily available.
In order to gauge the impact of Member States’ surpluses and deficits on public opinion
towards the European Commission, Member States are divided into those with surpluses
and those with deficits relative to the EU budget. These placements are performed on a
yearly basis. Although this resulted in some idiosyncratic dispositions (for example, the
United Kingdom is among the surplus countries for 2001) it is the most intuitive method by
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2015/iss1/8
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which to divide the Member States. Only Member States that had been part of the EU for
the whole year are considered. Thus, the countries that acceded during the 2004 enlargement are not incorporated until 2005 because they had not officially received membership
until May first. By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania, which entered on January 1, 2007, are
considered Member States for the 2007 analysis.
The mean responses of individuals in surplus and deficit Member States to a single
Eurobarometer query are then computed, along with their population standard deviations. This question inquired: “For each of the following European bodies, please tell
me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Commission.” (European
Commission, 2014). It has been asked in every standard Eurobarometer public-opinion
survey during the period covered by this study. The standard Eurobarometer surveys are
carried out by national institutes but coordinated by the European Commission (European
Commission, 2014). Interviews are conducted with approximately 1,000 people selected as
a representative sample of the population aged fifteen years and older in each Member State
(European Commission, 2014). Data generated by Eurobarometer public-opinion surveys
are often used in the scholarly literature and form a reliable source of information with
extensive temporal comparability (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Other scholars have instead
used the European Social Survey, but this data source is not as extensive for the purposes
of this project (Kumlin, 2009). Only the responses “tend to trust” and “tend not to trust”
are recorded. Since the response “don’t know” can either denote indifference or a lack of
knowledge, it would be inappropriate to include it. The standard deviations used mean
scores of individual countries as single data points, rather than every response in both the
spring and autumn Eurobarometer surveys. This slightly reduces the size of the standard
deviations. In the interests of time, the standard errors were calculated using the computed
standard deviations. The point of the standard deviations and standard errors is to demonstrate the relative strength of the association between a country’s budgetary relationship
with the EU and individual opinion within that country. Therefore, computing them based
on annual country response makes sense.
Results1
The analysis demonstrates a weak but present correlation between Member States’
surpluses and deficits relative to the EU budget and individuals’ trust in the European
Commission. Individuals in Member States with a surplus relative to the EU budget are
generally more likely to say that they trust the European Commission and less likely to say
that they do not trust it than those in Member States with a deficit. This holds true from
2000 to 2010 among respondents who said they tend to trust the European Commission
and from 2000 to 2012 among those who said they tend not to trust it. The timing of the
disruption of the relationship suggests that the EU budget impacts public opinion during
times of economic growth and does not hold when disturbed by more powerful events
such as recessions.
1

See the tables at the end of this article.
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Respondents in Member States with a surplus who tended to trust the European
Commission were more likely to do so by more than one standard deviation2 in 2000,
2002-2004, and 2006, and by nearly one standard deviation in 2005. Individuals in Member
States with a surplus who tended not to trust the European Commission were less likely
to do so by more than two standard deviations in 2003-2006, by almost two standard
deviations in 2002, by more than one standard deviation in 2000, 2007, and 2008, and by
almost one standard deviation in 2001. The relatively strong relationship between individuals in Member States with a surplus and greater levels of trust and lesser levels of distrust
in the European Commission only starts to break down after 2007-2008. At the same,
time standard deviations start to increase, from a minimum of 2.63 in 2003 and a relatively
low 5.45 in 2008 to 12.34 by 2013 in the case of those that tended to trust the European
Commission. For those that tended not to trust the European Commission, the standard
deviations increased from a minimum of 3.75 in 2003 and a relatively low 5.51 in 2008 to
a high of 16.4 in 2013. This could be symptomatic of the impact of economic recession,
whose effects on GNI are much greater than the EU budget. This seems particularly likely
given the increase in standard deviation. Levels of trust in Greece and Spain plummeted
after the recession, just as levels of distrust soared. Changes and differences in standard errors
are somewhat more pronounced.
The conclusiveness of these results is questionable. As with all analyses, particularly
those dealing with complex phenomena, there are many possible independent variables
that may be impactful. Furthermore, these may be causative at different strengths and in
varying combinations. This test of the relationship between public trust in the European
Commission and citizenship in Member States with surpluses and deficits relative to the EU
budget is certainly a simple one. Many more omitted and intervening variables would need
to be tested for the described relationships to become truly convincing. Nevertheless, the
data do demonstrate a certain degree of correlation. While small relative to larger economic
trends, such as a recession, it exerts some influence in economic equilibrium.
Implications
The results of this analysis possess important implications for the literatures on individual opinion on the EU, the efficacy of EU funds, and the attribution of accountability
within the EU. It has clearly demonstrated that the distribution of EU funds on a national
level has some impact on individual opinion about the European Commission. This contradicts two earlier sets of findings. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) argue “that the net return
from the EC budget has virtually no impact on citizen support for the community” (p.
525). On the contrary, there is some impact, at least on individual trust in the responsible
agency. The conclusions of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) were corroborated by a more
specific assessment of the impact of budgetary allocations on recipient groups, when being
involved in an economic sector subsidized by the EU was found to be uncorrelated with
individual opinion (Anderson & Reichart, 1996). However, this assumes that individuals
formulate their opinions based on their personal economic situation. As has been discussed,
perceptions of the performance of the national economy are more likely to influence
public-opinion formation (Duch, 2007, p. 811; Maravall, 2007, p. 916). Therefore, farmers
2

The standard deviations cited here are all based on the responses of Member States with surpluses.
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might not incorporate their personal subsidization by the EU as much as their country’s
subsidization of or by the EU. Individuals’ trust in the European Commission is affected by
national welfare gains from the EU budget.
If individuals’ perceptions of the European Commission are shaped by their country’s
budgetary relationship with the EU, then they are capable of attributing supranational
budgetary responsibility. That individuals’ trust in the European Commission correlates to
whether their Member State has a surplus or deficit relative to the EU budget suggests that
they can ascribe responsibility to specific institutions. Rather than merely relating budgetary
allocations to the EU as a general concept, they do so to the specific body charged with
their disbursement. This has the potential to inform the literature on the attribution of
blame within the EU and other multilevel governance structures more generally. It may be
more significant as this is a new and developing field (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a; Hobolt &
Tilley, 2014b). In the first comprehensive study of citizens’ attribution of responsibility in
the EU, Hobolt & Tilley (2014b) argue that “European citizens appear capable of making
distinctions in terms of what different levels of governments do” (p. 809). The results of
this analysis lend credence to their position, strengthening the hypothesis that individuals
are capable of successful attributing policy outcomes to the bodies responsible for their
construction.
This analysis also re-emphasizes an overlooked metric for the evaluation of EU funds.
Previous work has emphasized the economic or social impacts of EU funds in a narrow
mode (Bachtler & Gorzelak, 2007; Mitchell, 2015). Only in a tangential and programspecific fashion, or as part of larger studies incorporating independent variables beyond EU
funds have scholars explored the relationship between budgetary dynamics and institutional
legitimacy (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Van Mol, 2013). EU funds could be considered
worthwhile if they contribute to the legitimacy of either associated institutions or the organization in general, which it appears they might.
This is certainly the most significant policy implication to be drawn from this analysis.
The redistribution undertaken by the EU budget is correlated with individuals’ opinion of
the EU. This should inject an additional note of caution into the debt negotiations currently underway with Greece as well as with the broader policy of national bailouts. It
should also temper optimism about the success of integrating policies that would require
further redistribution. At the same time, it offers a potentially encouraging conclusion.
Once European economies return to states of growth, EU funds could offer a limited means
of reconstructing public trust in the EU.
Conclusion
Individual opinion on the EU, operating at the aggregate level, is consequential.
Citizens regularly indicate their preferences through formal and informal channels by voting and participating in social organizations. More generally, the legitimacy of the EU as a
polity is dependent on the maintenance of a plural permissive consensus, if not on active
popular support. What causes individual opinions about the EU and European integration
to form and change is therefore a highly developed and impactful field of study. Despite the
differentiation between advocates of identity and utilitarian rationales, most analyses have
focused on support for membership within the EU as a proxy for European integration,
against which they have tested a barrage of hypothesized independent variables. In doing
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so, they have often overlooked a secondary dependent variable: support for the EU as an
institution. This study hypothesizes that this variable, operationalized by individual trust in
the European Commission, should be correlated with Member States’ surpluses or deficits
relative to the EU budget. It discovered that such a relationship exists to a restricted degree
in times of economic growth but has been disrupted by the recent recession.
Besides the literature on individual attitudes towards the EU, this conclusion has implications for future scholarship on EU funds and accountability. It offers a different metric for
evaluating the impact, and thus the value of EU funds, which have previously been viewed
narrowly in economic terms, except where programs were social in nature. It also corroborates the conclusions of those researching the attribution of responsibility within the EU
that citizens are capable to some degree of correctly associating institutions with programs.
Tables
Question relevant for Table 1 and Table 2: “For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Commission.”
(European Commission, 2014).
Table 1: Respondents who “Tend to trust” the European Commission

Source: European Commission (2014).
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Table 2: Respondents who “Tend not to trust” the European Commission

Source: European Commission (2014).
Table 3: Member States’ Relationship with the EU Budget
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Source: EUR-Lex (2014).
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